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Over the last decade the global movement toward involvement of the private sector in the 
provision of municipal water supply and sanitation services has been rapidly gaining momentum-
-and so has the political opposition.  Is it true that poor households in developing countries 
oppose private sector involvement in the provision of municipal services?  Are poor households 
actually hurt when private sector providers are engaged to deliver water services?  We seek to 
contribute to this debate by examining households’ demand for the improved water services in 
Kathmandu, Nepal where the government is considering the possibility of involving the private 
sector in the operation of municipal water supply services.  We surveyed a randomly selected 
sample of 1500 households in the Kathmandu Valley and asked respondents questions in in-
person interviews about how they would vote if given the choice between their existing water 
supply situation and an improved water service provided by a private operator.  The results 
provide the first evidence from South Asia that households’ willingness to pay for improved 
water services are much higher than their current water bills.  Moreover, our results suggest that 
households in Kathmandu are positively inclined toward the involvement of the private sector in 
the effort to improve the quality and reliability of piped water services.  We find substantial 
public support among both poor and nonpoor of households for a privatization plan that would 
improve water supply and require all participants to pay regular and higher monthly bills. 
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Do Households Want Privatized Municipal Water Services?   
Evidence from Kathmandu, Nepal 
1.  Introduction 
 Over the last decade the global movement toward involvement of the private sector in the 
provision of municipal water supply and sanitation services has been rapidly gaining momentum-
-and so has the political opposition. Efforts to privatize municipal water services have become a 
lightning rod for groups struggling against the economic and political forces pushing 
globalization and a potent symbol of what is wrong with the development approach advocated by 
the World Bank and other multilateral agencies to bring global market forces to bear on 
economies in developing countries (Stiglitz, 2002).  The authors of the Water Manifesto (2000) 
have succinctly summed up the position of opponents to privatization. 
Proponents of private sector involvement in the municipal water sector cite three main 
benefits.  First, they argue that the private sector is able to deliver services more efficiently than 
public sector providers, thus lowering the real costs of service provision.  Second, the private 
sector can mobilize capital to finance much needed service improvements for both existing 
populations and population growth.  Third, and perhaps most importantly, it is argued that 
privatization offers the only politically feasible avenue open to replace the corrupt, rent-seeking 
management teams ensconced in many water utilities in developing countries. 
 Opponents of privatization argue that introducing a private operator and the profit motive 
into the provision of municipal water services will severely harm poor households.  Thus 
protesters on the streets of Seattle and elsewhere seek to align themselves with the 
disenfranchised poor who they feel have no way to make their voices heard in the halls of the 
World Bank or the boards of the global corporations in the water supply business.  But is it true 
that poor households in developing countries oppose private sector involvement in the provision 
of municipal services?  Are poor households actually hurt when private sector providers are 
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engaged to deliver water services?  If the voices of poor households were heard, might they 
actually support private sector involvement in the municipal water sector? 
 These are empirical questions that numerous researchers are now investigating.  At least 
in Manila there is prima facie evidence that the argument that private sector operators hurt the 
poor should not be taken at face value.  In Manila, the involvement of the private sector has 
resulted in the monthly cost of water provision to households falling and approximately 400,000 
new customers being connected (Dumol, 2000). 
 In this paper we seek to contribute to this debate by examining households’ demand for 
the improved water services provided by a private operator before a privatization deal is 
concluded.   The Government of Nepal is considering the possibility of involving the private 
sector in the operation of municipal water supply services in the Kathmandu Valley.   In April 
and March, 2001, we surveyed a randomly selected sample of 1500 households in the Kathmandu 
Valley and asked respondents questions in in-person interviews about how they would vote if 
given the choice between their existing water supply situation and an improved water service 
provided by a private operator.  Respondents were told, however, that the improved services 
provided by the private operator would entail substantially higher water bills.  By presenting 
different subsamples of randomly selected households different typical monthly water bills, we 
were able to estimate how support for the new privatized water service would decrease as the cost 
of the new service increased. 
 We also asked households with different existing water supply situations what they 
would do if the new private water service were installed and water tariffs were increased.  For 
example, would households that currently do not have a connection to the water distribution 
system decide to connect if service was improved and tariffs were increased?  How many 
households currently with a connection to the existing piped distribution system would decide to 
disconnect from a new improved water distribution system managed by a private operator if 
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prices were raised a specified amount?  Because we collected considerable information on the 
socioeconomic status of households in the sample, we can determine the preferences of both poor 
and nonpoor households for such changes in service levels. 
 Our results show that there is strong support among both poor and nonpoor households 
for a plan that would involve the private sector in the operation of the municipal water supply 
system in the five municipalities of the Kathmandu Valley if this would result in improved 
services and higher water tariffs.  We estimate that approximately 70 percent of the population 
would be willing to pay a fivefold increase in the current average water bill for improved services 
provided by a private operator. 
 This paper is organized as follows.  In the next, second section of the paper we  
briefly describe the existing municipal water supply situation in the Kathmandu Valley.  The third 
section presents the research design used in this study.  In the fourth section we describe the 
fieldwork and sampling strategy.  In the fifth section we present the findings of the research, and 
in the sixth section we offer some concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Background: the Existing Municipal Water Situation in the Kathmandu Valley 
 To better understand why sample respondents answered our questions the way they did, it 
is necessary to briefly describe the current condition of the municipal water supply distribution 
system in the Kathmandu Valley.   The National Water Supply Corporation (NWSC) supplies 
piped water services to the five main cities in the Kathmandu Valley.  The total population in the 
NWSC’s service area is approximately 1 million people.   
During the dry summer months, the population of the Kathamndu Valley currently faces 
chronic water shortages.   The NWSC produces about 120 million liters per day during the wet 
season, but only 80 million cubic meters per day during the dry season due to limited water 
storage.  Much of the water that is produced is lost before it reaches the NWSC’s customers.  
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Because many households have unmetered connections or connections with broken meters, it is 
difficult to estimate precisely how much of the water produced actually reaches NWSC’s 
customers, but estimates of unaccounted for water are on the order of 40 percent.  What is certain 
is that pressures in the distribution system must be kept very low in many parts of the city to 
avoid massive leakage.  The secondary and tertiary piped distribution system is in such poor 
condition in some neighborhoods that it is questionable whether the capital stock would have any 
residual value to a private operator; much of the distribution system must simply be replaced. 
About seventy percent of the population within NWSC’s service area has a private 
connection to the distribution system, but the quality of service provided is very low.  Most 
households only receive water for a few hours a day.  As in many former British colonies, the 
intermittent water service means that the distribution system is subject to negative pressures and 
chronic contamination from groundwater infiltration.   Because the water service from the piped 
distribution system is poor, many households with private connections also rely on alternative 
sources of water, such as private wells, public taps, and tanker truck vendors.   
The ability of households to continue to rely on private wells is in doubt.  The total 
sustainable yield of the groundwater aquifer is approximately 26 million liters per day.  Total 
groundwater extraction is currently about 59 million liters per day.  As a result the groundwater 
table is falling, and contamination is increasing. 
Households without their own private connection may obtain water from a variety of 
sources.  Some collect water from neighbors with private connections, for which they may pay a 
fee.  Others collect water from an ancient system of stone conduits and public taps (called “stone 
spouts”) that delivers water from nearby mountain springs to selected central locations in the five 
cities.  Tanker trucks operated by the NWSC serve some outlying areas, filling household storage 
tanks for a nominal fee.  Many unconnected households have dug private wells on their property; 
these are largely used for water for washing and bathing. 
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 In summary, it is not hard to see why households in the Kathmandu Valley would want 
improved water services.  The existing system delivers low volumes of poor quality water on an 
irregular basis.  The only appealing aspect of the existing service from the households’ 
perspective is that at least they do not have to pay much for it: average monthly water bills are on 
the order of NPR 100 to 158 (US$1.39 to 2.19) per month.2  But even this is somewhat 
misleading.  Because the water supply is unreliable, if they can afford the expense, many 
households install overhead water tanks to store water.  And because the water is often of poor 
quality, many households are forced to treat their water before drinking or cooking.  What is not 
known is whether households would welcome private sector involvement in improving the 
existing water system, and how much they would be willing to pay for such improvements. 
 
3. Conceptual Framework and Study Design 
To explore these issues, a survey was designed to gauge households’ reactions to a 
possible plan to engage a private sector operator in order to improve several attributes of the 
service provided by the piped distribution system.  Because households in the Kathmandu Valley 
are currently obtaining their water from a variety of different sources and have different housing 
arrangements, it did not make sense to ask all households in the sample precisely the same 
questions about whether they would support a plan to improve water services, and what they 
would do if a new, improved water service were available.   We thus designed different versions 
of the questionnaire for various groups of households. 
There are two main groups of households in the Kathmandu Valley: (1) households with 
connections to the existing NWSC piped distribution system; and (2) households without 
connections to the existing NWSC distribution system.  A third group uses shared connections to 
the NWSC distribution system.  Each of these three groups received different versions of the 
                                                 
2 The exchange rate used throughout the study is NPR (Nepalese Rupees) 72 to US$1.
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survey instrument.  However, because the number of households relying on shared connections is 
quite small (about 0.8 percent of the sample population), in the remainder of this paper we focus 
only on the first and second groups. 
Respondents were told about a plan that would engage the private sector to improve the 
water supply system.  They were asked to suppose that the improved system would provide 24-
hours service, that water would be safe to drink from the tap, and that the private operator would 
provide accurate billing of the water they received.  Households with connections to the existing 
distribution system were then told … 
I want you to suppose that the improved water service for households in the Kathmandu Valley 
with a private NWSC connection would result in a total monthly water bill for a typical 
household like yours of (200/400/600/800/1000/1300/1600/2000 NPR.).  Let's assume that a 
water bill of this size would entitle a typical household to about 500 liters of water per day. 
 
Respondents were then asked whether they would vote for the water supply improvement 
plan.  The eight different amounts of monthly water bills were randomly assigned to subsamples 
of respondents with private connections (i.e., some sample respondents received one monthly 
water bill, and other subsamples received different monthly water bills).  Respondents were then 
asked to explain their reasons for voting for or against the plan. 
Next, respondents were told … 
Now, I want you to suppose that in fact most people did vote for the plan to improve the water 
supply system.  Assume that the typical household's monthly water bill for 500 liters of water per 
day increased to [200/400/600/800/1000/1300/1600/2000 NPR]. What do you think your 
household would do? 
Stay connected and pay the higher water bill 
Disconnect and find water elsewhere 
Don't Know 
 
Respondents were then asked to how confident they were of their answer. 
Households currently without connections were also asked how they would vote on the 
plan, but they were told that they could choose to have either a private or a shared connection 
with improved water service.  Respondents were told to assume that the monthly cost of a shared 
connection would be half the cost of a private connection. The crowded housing conditions in a 
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city like Kathmandu may in fact preclude an unconnected household from obtaining a private 
metered water connection.  For example, if a household lived in a single room in a multi-story 
building, or a single room with no space outside for a yard tap, it might not be realistic to imagine 
that a private water connection could be installed; there would simply be no place for the tap, or 
for wastewater to drain.  In such cases, it makes little sense to ask a respondent whether he or she 
would be willing to pay a specified price to have a private water connection installed.  Instead, we 
just asked such households about their willingness to pay for a shared connection.  (In fact, it 
turned out that there were few households in the final sample who felt that it was not feasible for 
them to have a private connection, and these households are not included in the results presented 
in this paper). 
Households without private connections who felt that it was technically feasible for them 
to have a private connection were further subdivided into owners and renters.  We could not ask 
renters without connections precisely the same contingent valuation questions as owners because 
renters without connections would have less incentive to pay the connection charges associated 
with a shared or private connection.  We thus asked renters to suppose that the landlord would 
pay the connections charges, and the renter would face an increase in his monthly rent in 
exchange for the improved water service provided by the private operator.   
 Figure 1 summarizes the research design used in this study.  As shown eight different 
versions of the questionnaire were administered during the survey.  For the remainder of the 
paper we focus on (1) the households who currently have a private connection (both owners and 
renters); we term these Group I households; and (2) households without private connections who 
felt that it was technically feasible for them to have a private connection (both owners and 
renters); we term these Group II households. 
The two main valuation questions actually pose complex choices and require careful 
consideration on the part of the respondent.  The first question asks about the respondent’s 
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willingness to support (vote for) a public action (in this case the involvement of a private sector 
operator in the implementation of service improvements); the second question asks about private 
behavior (what the respondent’s household would actually do if confronted with a choice to 
connect to the new system).  We felt that it was necessary to ask both questions because they 
mirror the political economy of water supply improvements in a city like Kathmandu.   
The status quo decision problem for most households in the Kathmandu Valley is a 
choice between (1) a connection to the distribution system that provides poor service at a low 
cost, and (2) relying on water sources other than a private connection.  The two CV questions 
effectively create two new decision problems for the respondent.  As depicted in Table 1, the first 
CV question asks the respondent to choose between two choice sets:  
(1)  Status quo [no plan]: (a connection to the distribution system that provides poor service at a 
low cost) vs. (relying on water sources other than a private connection) 
(2) Change [plan implemented]: (a connection to an improved distribution system that provides 
good service at higher cost) vs. (relying on water sources other than a private connection). 
The first CV question does not ask the respondent to indicate what he would actually do, only 
from which of the two choice sets he would prefer to choose.    
For a household without a private connection, the main reason not to vote for the plan 
(i.e., answering YES to this first CV question) is that the option of connecting to the existing 
system in the future is removed.3  Presumably this is not likely to be perceived as a large cost 
because the respondent’s household has the option of connecting to the existing system now and 
decided not to do so.  On the other hand, a respondent with a private connection has a strong 
incentive to vote NO if he prefers the existing system to the improved system because the 
                                                 
3   Households without a private connection that relied on water from neighbors with piped connections 
might be concerned that the price of water that their neighbors charged them would increase if the plan for 
the new improved system were implemented.  
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implementation of the plan would remove the option of having a connection to the existing 
system.  
 The second CV question restricts the respondent’s options by asking him to imagine that 
the plan to improve water services was indeed approved and implemented, and that the first 
choice set above was removed from consideration: his household no longer had the option of 
having a connection that provided poor service at a low price.  This restriction of the respondent’s 
options to the second choice set could reduce his household’s welfare, even if he indicated that 
his household would stayed connected and pay the higher price for the improved service. 
 Table 2 shows the six alternative ways a respondent might rank three possible “states of 
the world”: (A) connected to a new private system with high quality and a higher monthly bill; 
(B) connected to existing system with low quality and a low monthly bill, and (C) disconnected 
from piped distribution system, rely on other sources.  What can a respondent’s answers to the 
two CV questions and his choice of water sources in the current situation tell us about his 
household’s preferences?    
Consider first a household that already has a private connection.  We can rule out 
rankings 2, 5, and 6 because in these three rankings being disconnected from the existing system 
(C) is preferred to having a private connection to the existing system (B), but in fact we know the 
household chose B over C.  What can the answers to the two CV questions tell us about the 
respondent's preferences among the remaining rankings (1, 3, and 4)?   
The two CV questions yield four possible patterns of responses (Table 3). For example, 
consider a household that currently has a connection to the piped distribution system.  Two of the 
possibilities are straightforward.  First, such a respondent could vote for the plan and then agree 
to stay connected to the distribution system at the new, higher tariff (Pattern 1 in Table 3).  We 
propose to interpret a “yes/yes” response to the two CV questions as indicating that the 
respondent holds ranking 1, not ranking 3 or 4.  That is, if the respondent voted for the plan and 
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said his household would connect to the new system at the offered monthly bill, we assume he 
prefers a connection to the new system at the specified monthly bill to his connection to the old 
system, and experiences a welfare gain from the implementation of the plan and paying the higher 
tariff. 
Second, a respondent could vote against the plan, and, if the plan were implemented, 
decide to disconnect form the piped distribution system (Pattern 4 in Table 3).  We interpret such 
a “No/No” response to the two CV questions as indicating that the respondent holds ranking 4, 
not ranking 1 or 3.  That is, if the respondent (whose household is already connected to the 
existing system) voted against the plan and said that his household would disconnect for the 
existing system if the plan were implemented, we assume that he prefers a connection to the 
existing system to the new system, and would experience a welfare lose if the plan were 
implemented and his household choose to disconnect from the system.  
Third, a respondent could vote against the plan, but then indicate that if the plan were 
implemented, her household would decide to stay connected to the new system (Pattern 3 in 
Table 3).  In other words, she preferred the status quo situation, but if this option were removed 
from her choice set, her household would choose the new system and higher tariff rather than 
disconnect from the piped distribution system.  We interpret such a “No/Yes” response to the two 
CV questions as indicating that the respondent holds ranking 3, not ranking 1 or 4.  That is, if the 
respondent (whose household is already connected to the existing system) voted against the plan, 
but said that her household would stay connected to the distribution system if the plan were 
implemented, we assume that she prefers a connection to the existing system to a connection to 
the new system, but prefers a connection to the new system to being disconnected.  In this 
instance the household would be made worse off as a result of the implementation of the plan for 
improved water services, even though it would decide to remain connected and pay the higher 
price.    
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 Fourth, a respondent could vote “Yes” for the plan and then decide not to stay connected 
to the piped distribution system (Pattern 2 in Table 3).   A respondent might value the option of 
connecting to an improved distribution system in the future, but know that his household could 
not afford it now. Conceivably a respondent could vote for the plan for altruistic reasons (e.g., 
because he believed that it would improve the health of his neighbors and school-age children), 
knowing that his household could not afford the new water service.   We interpret a “Yes/No” 
response to the two CV questions as indicating that the respondent holds ranking 1, not ranking 3 
or 4. 
 For households that are not currently connected to the distribution system, we can rule 
out rankings 1, 3, and 4 because in these three rankings B is preferred to C, but in fact we know 
the household chose C over B.  We again attempt to interpret the four possible patterns of 
responses to the two CV questions, but in this case a household that votes for the plan may prefer 
either a private connection or a shared connection to the new system.  If a respondent without a 
private connection votes for the plan and then says that his household would connect to the 
improved system (a “Yes/Yes response), we interpret this as an indication of ranking 2.  We 
interpret a “No/No” response as an indication of ranking 5 or 6 (we cannot determine how the 
unconnected household ranks a connection to the new system versus a connection to the old 
system).   
A “No/Yes” response for an unconnected household might seem to be an inconsistent 
answer; it is, however, conceivable that the respondent is worried about the implications of the 
plan for others (perhaps the poor) and votes against it.  But once the plan is passed, the 
respondent is free to indicate his personal preference to connect his household to the new system 
(either a private or shared connection).   
We interpret a “Yes/No” response for an unconnected household as an indication that the 
respondent holds ranking 5.  We interpret a “YES” vote to the first CV question as an indication 
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that the respondent prefers a connection to the new system to a connection to the old system, 
ruling out ranking 6.   A “No” vote to the second CV question indicates that the respondent 
prefers being disconnected to having a private connection to the new system. Note that in this 
case being connected to the new system is preferred to being connected to the existing system, 
and the “Yes” vote to the first CV question might indicate a willingness on the part of the 
respondent to pay for having this option in the future.   
 
4.  Field Implementation 
Sampling Strategy  
       Households were selected using a multi-stage cluster sampling procedure.  Clusters were 
located using aerial maps provided by the Central Bureau of Statistics for the 1996/97 World 
Bank Living Standard Measurement Survey for Kathmandu.  In three of the five municipalities in 
the Kathmandu Valley (Kathmandu, Lalitpur, and Bhaktapur), we used a previously conducted 
complete enumeration of all households as our sample frame (Silt-DRTC, 1999).  In Kirtipur and 
Madhayapur we used the 1991 population census as the sampling frame.  
 Wards were selected from the sampling frame on the basis of a probability-proportional-
to-size sampling approach that ensured households had an equal opportunity of being included in 
the sample (Babbie, 1990; Kirkwood, 1996).  After a ward was selected for inclusion in the 
sample, sub-wards were drawn randomly. The final sample consisted of 60 clusters of 25 
households each covering all five municipalities in the Kathmandu Valley.  If a cluster was 
selected for inclusion in the sample, then a respondent in all 25 households in that cluster was 
interviewed for this study. Because probability-proportional-to-size sampling depends on the size 
of the population, some wards had more than one cluster in the final sample. 
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Questionnaire Development 
 The design of the household questionnaire was based on the World Bank’s Living 
Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) guidance manual (Grosh and Glewwe, 2000). The LSMS 
modules for water supply conditions were modified to suit local conditions in the Kathmandu 
Valley based on purposive open-ended discussions with 17 households, two focus groups, and a 
pretest of 150 households.  
 Some participants in the focus groups and respondents in the purposive discussions did 
express reservations about private sector participation in the municipal water supply sector 
because they regarded water service as an entitlement that should be provided free by the 
government.  These views were not, however, strongly held by most respondents, and group 
discussion of these issues convinced most participants that (1) improvement in current conditions 
was only possible through increased investments that should at least in part be financed by higher 
monthly water bills, and (2) private sector participation was more likely to result in improvements 
in service quality than government provision.  Focus group participants who did not now have a 
NWSC connection were particularly concerned that opportunities be provided to finance the 
connection charge to the distribution network. Based on the concerns participants expressed in 
the focus group discussions, the contingent valuation scenario emphasized three aspects of the 
proposed improved service: longer hours of service, health risk, regularity of billing.   
 The final questionnaire consisted of the following eight sections: (1) introduction, 
household location, (2) urban environmental priorities, (3) priorities for networked infrastructure 
services, (4) existing water sources, (5) water treatment and storage practices, (6) sanitation 
conditions, (7) contingent valuation questions, and (8) socioeconomic profile. 
 For households in which both a husband and wife were living at home, interviews were 
conducted with either the head of household or his spouse.  For female-headed households, only 
the senior female adult was interviewed. The interviews lasted 45-60 minutes.   
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5.  Empirical Findings 
Socioeconomic Profile of Respondents 
 Table 4 presents a socioeconomic profile of the sample respondents.  The typical 
respondent in the sample was a 37-year old Newari male head of household.  He had a spouse and 
four children less than 18 years of age living at home. He had 10 years of education and could 
read a newspaper easily.  He owned his house, which was a single-family, multistory building 
that had at least four rooms, and he rented out one room. The floor, walls, and roof of his house 
were made of concrete.  He had electricity and telephone service, for which he paid about NPR 
520 and 690 (US$7.22 and 9.58) per month, respectively.  He also had a private water connection 
and water-sealed toilet for the exclusive use of his household members (and any renters).   
 The average respondent reported household income of NPR 16,351 (US$227.10) and 
monthly expenditures of NPR 10,868 (US$150.94) [almost half of which was spent on food]. The 
typical household owns one television and one radio, and more than one kerosene stove, pressure 
cooker, and electric fan.  The typical household does not, however, own a videocassette recorder, 
bicycle, sewing machine, or rice cooker.  About 47 percent of sample households used bottled gas 
as their primary cooking fuel; 40 percent use kerosene. 
 We used five criteria to develop a better understanding of the number of poor households 
in our sample and their living conditions: (1) reported monthly income, (2) monthly expenditures, 
(3) housing construction materials, (4) type of cooking fuel, and (5) self-reported socioeconomic 
status.  We defined the following “poverty lines” based on the frequency distributions of these 
five indicators of socioeconomic status: 
(1)  Monthly household income less than NPR 3,500 (US$48.61) [lowest decile of the sample 
population]; 
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(2)  Monthly expenditures less than NPR 3,600 (US$50.00) [the lowest decile of the sample 
population]; 
(3) Housing unit with mud floors and wall, and a roof that was not concrete; 
(4) Cooking with wood, dried cow dung, or straw; and 
(5) A self-designation of “poor” or “destitute.” 
For the purposes of our analysis, we classified a household as “poor” if it had two or more of the 
above features.  On this basis, we designated 520 households (approximately 35 percent of the 
sample) as “poor.” 
 Thirty-four percent of the respondents from these poor households had never attended 
school. Over one-third said that it would not be possible for them to borrow NPR 3,000 to 5,000 
(US$41.67 to 69.44) from a moneylender. Sixty-one percent of the poor households cook with 
kerosene.  Fifty-three percent own a radio and television (11 percent have neither).  The median 
monthly income and expenditure of these households is about NPR 6,000 and 5,170 (US$83.33 
and 71.83), respectively. 
 
The Existing Water Supply and Sanitation Situation of Sample Households 
 Sixty-nine percent of the households in the sample had a private water connection in their 
own name (i.e., they received the water bill from the National Water Supply Corporation).   
About 1 percent used water from a shared connection to the piped distribution network.  The 
remaining 30 percent of households were not connected to the piped distribution system and 
obtained their water from a variety of sources, including private wells, public taps, stone spouts, 
and water vendors.  
 
Households with a NWSC Connection (Group I) 
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 Three quarters of households with a NWSC connection report that they have a water 
meter; most of those who have a water meter say that it is working (94 percent). The median 
water bill of a household with a metered connection that was working is NPR 75 (US$1.04).  
Given the tariff structure in effect at the time of our survey, this implies average monthly water 
use of about 9 cubic meters.   The average water bill of a household with an unmetered NWSC 
connection was NPR 100 (US$1.39).   
 We asked respondents with private connections what they liked least about their water 
service from the piped system.  Sixty-seven percent said its unreliability.  This is perhaps not 
surprising considering that water is available from their connection on average about 2 hours per 
day in the rainy season and 1 hour per day in the dry season.  Eighteen percent of respondents 
said that the thing they liked least was the poor quality of the water.  Among households that had 
private connections, there were no significant differences between poor and nonpoor households 
regarding the aspect of the water service they liked least. 
 Given the poor reliability of the piped water supply, many households with private 
connections supplement the water they receive from the piped distribution network with water 
from other sources.  The majority of households with private connections reported using water 
from at least one other source – public taps, private wells, vendors, stone taps, bottled water, 
rainwater, or surface water on a regular basis. 
 Sample respondents perceive significant differences in the taste, color, and health risk of 
water from the various sources available to them.  Many respondents perceived the quality of 
water from the stone taps to be significantly better than from other sources.  Water from the piped 
distribution system had a high negative rating.  Many people also perceived the quality of water 
from private wells to be poor.  Among households with private connections, there were no 
significant differences between poor and nonpoor households in their perceptions of the quality 
of water from different sources. 
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 Because the quality of water from the piped distribution system was widely perceived to 
be poor, the majority (74 percent) of both poor and nonpoor households with private connections 
treat their drinking water in some way (either filtering or boiling it, adding chlorine, or even using 
more sophisticated technologies).  Sixty-four percent of households with private connections 
have installed overhead water storage tanks to deal with the unreliability of supply (with a median 
size of about 1 cubic meters and a median cost of NPR 4500 [US$62.50] per storage tank).  In 
fact, 45 percent of the households with private connections have more than one overhead storage 
tank.  The average household with a private connection can store about 1.1 (median) cubic meters 
of water.  Poor households with private connections, however, have significantly less storage than 
non-poor households (0.5 versus 1.1 cubic meters). 
 
Households without a private or shared connection (Group II) 
 The 411 respondents in our sample who had neither their own private connection nor a 
shared connection relied on a variety of alternative water sources, primarily public taps, private 
wells, neighbors, vendors, stone taps.  A significantly higher proportion of Group II households 
were poor compared to Group I households (55% versus 26%).  
 On average, Group II households collected 50 liters of water per day per household 
member. Very few households in Group II pay for water; most relied on neighbors, free public 
taps, and private wells.  Such households did, however, incur indirect (i.e., “coping”) costs to 
collect water.   The majority of Group II households relied on neighbors and public taps for their 
drinking and cooking water and on water from private wells for bathing and washing.  Only 1 
percent purchased water from tanker truck vendors on a regular basis. 
 Like Group I households, Group II households said that the things they liked least about 
the piped water system was the unreliable service and the poor water quality.  Group II 
households held similar perceptions of the color, taste, and health risk of the water form 
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alternative sources as Group I households.  Among Group II households, there were no 
significant differences in such perceptions between poor and nonpoor households.  
 Unlike Group I households, most Group II households (approximately 62%) did not treat 
their water before using it for drinking and cooking.  They had on average 1.1 (median) cubic 
meters of water storage capacity at home, significantly less that Group I households.  
 
Household Sanitation Conditions 
 Table 5 shows the percentage of poor and nonpoor households with water-sealed toilets 
in both Group I and Group II households.  As shown 92 percent of the households in our sample 
have installed a water-sealed toilet (either a pour flush or a flush toilet with a water closet).   The 
vast majority of households are either “very satisfied” or “somewhat satisfied” with their toilet 
facilities.  However, the poor are much less likely than the nonpoor households to have a water-
sealed toilet. 
 
Household Demand for Improved Water Services 
Households with Private Connections (Group I) 
 Forty percent of the Group I households had heard of the Government’s interest in 
involving the private sector in the operation of the municipal water supply.  In their answers to 
the first CV question, households with a private water connection expressed strong support for 
the plan described in the survey that required households to pay higher water bills in exchange for 
improved service. Ninety-six percent of respondents who received a price of NPR 200 (US$2.78) 
said that would vote for the plan if this were a typical household’s monthly water bill with the 
new system and that they would connect to the new improved system (Table 6). Fifty percent of 
households who received a price of NPR 1000 (US$13.89) voted for the plan and said that they 
would connect to the new system.  Households were asked how certain they were about how they 
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would vote.  About 78 percent of the respondents with “Yes/Yes” responses to the two CV 
questions indicated that they were “totally sure” of their answer; 20 percent said they were 
“somewhat sure.” 
 About 84 percent of respondents who voted for the plan and indicated that they would 
connect said that their main reason was that they “really wanted/needed the improved water 
service.”  Among respondents who voted against the plan and said they would not connect, about 
90 percent gave their main reason, as “the increased water bill is too high.”  It thus appears that 
the respondents listened carefully to the description of the plan in the contingent valuation 
scenario, and gave answers that were conditioned on the size of the water bill and that they were 
confident about their preferences. 
In Section 4 we discussed four response patterns to the two contingent valuation 
questions.  Table 7 shows the number of connected households who fell into each of the four 
response patterns.  A majority of our respondents either voted for the plan and chose to stay 
connected, or voted against the plan and chose to disconnect.  However, a non-trivial number 
revealed either a Yes-No or a No-Yes response pattern.  What does this imply about how we 
estimate the value of improved water supply in Kathmandu Valley for the subsample of 
households with connections to the existing system?  If we were to assume that respondents’ 
answers to the two CV questions were based on purely private motives, the four response patterns 
suggest the economic welfare or value implications summarized in Table 8. 
Households may, however, reveal altruistic or public motives in addition to private 
preferences in responding to these questions.  From our survey results, it is impossible to 
disentangle respondents’ public and private motivations.  Therefore, we propose four ways to 
analyze these data, which are described below as Options 1 through 4:   
Option 1.  Consider private preferences and values as the primary basis for responding to 
the two CV questions.  This would imply that the welfare implications in Table 8 would 
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hold.  From an implementation perspective, we would use the responses to the first CV 
question (vote) in estimating the value of the proposed service.  
Option 2.  Essentially consider the same motives and pattern as Option 1, except attribute 
the responses of the Yes-No respondents to ambivalence or confusion.  From an 
implementation perspective, only count the Yes-Yes pattern as a “Yes”, and all three 
other patterns as no.  By discounting the responses of households who did not respond 
with absolute consistency, we will clearly lower our estimate of WTP.  Option 2 reflects 
the most conservative estimate.   
Option 3.  Include possible public or altruistic values and motives in interpreting the 
response patterns.  This would suggest that we consider only the response to the second 
CV question (stay connected / disconnect) in estimating WTP. 
Option 4.  Disregard the households who gave Yes-No or No-Yes responses on grounds 
of inconsistency and leave them out of the analysis.  This effectively reduces the size of 
the data set.  The difference between Option 2 and 4 is that the Yes-No and No-Yes are 
treated as No in Option 2, where as they are dropped in Option 4.  Given that all the 
response patterns are logical and credible, this reflects that most drastic approach.  
The welfare estimates associated with Options 1 through 4, in terms of mean and 95% confidence 
intervals are presented in Table 9.  As expected Option 2 has the lowest estimate of WTP and 
Option 4 has the highest WTP.  The estimates clearly depend of the approach chosen, but from a 
policy perspective all four approaches show household WTP to be much higher than current 
water bills. 
 
Households without Private or Shared Connections (Group II) 
 There was also strong support for the plan among the 411 households currently without a 
household connection who said it was possible for them to be connected.  About 88 percent of 
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these unconnected households (who were offered a price of NPR 200 [US$2.78] for a private 
connection and NPR 100 [US$1.39] for a shared connection) voted for the plan and indicated that 
they would pay for either a private or shared connection (Table 10).   As shown in Figure 2, the 
proportion of Group II respondents who chose a private or shared connection or neither in 
respondents varied depending on the size of the proposed monthly bill.  Fifty-eight percent of the 
unconnected households who received prices of NPR 800 and 400 (US$11.11 and 5.56) for a 
private and shared connection respectively voted for the plan.   About 61 percent of these said 
they would choose a private connection; thirty-nine percent would choose a shared connection. 
 Like households in Group I, respondents without NWSC connections who voted for the 
plan gave as their main reason that “they really wanted/needed the improved water service” 
(about 93 percent).  Those who voted against the plan gave as their main reason that “the 
increased bill is too high” (90 percent).  Respondents without NCWS connections were equally 
sure of their answers and expressed little uncertainty as to how they would vote or what they 
would do. 
Table 11 shows the number of unconnected households who fell into each response pattern (1– 
4).  Almost all the unconnected households either voted for the plan and chose to connect, or 
voted against the plan and chose to stay unconnected.  A very small minority revealed either a 
Yes-No or a No-Yes response pattern.  
What does this imply about how we estimate the value of improved water supply in 
Kathmandu Valley for the subsample of households without connections to the existing system?  
If we assume that our respondents based their answers to the two CV questions on purely private 
motives, the four response patterns have different implications for economic welfare, and we 
could develop four options paralleling the structure described above for connected households 
(see Table 12).  However, the small numbers of households who answered either Yes-No (18 
households) or No-Yes (5 households) makes this an unimportant exercise from a practical 
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perspective.  That is, we considered only the response to the second CV question (stay connected 
/ disconnect) in estimating WTP. 
Figure 2 also describes this subgroup’s preference for ‘private’, ‘shared’ or ‘existing 
sources’ at different levels of proposed monthly bills.  These inverse demand data show how 
many people would connect to a private or shared connection at different levels of the proposed 
monthly bill. The higher the bill, the greater the percentage of respondents stating that they would 
not prefer either a private or a shared connection.  Almost 50 percent of these households are 
willing to pay NPR 500 (US$6.94) for a private connection that includes about 500 liters of water 
a day if the water is potable and the water bills are accurate and regular.  
Based on a method proposed by McFadden (1976), the mean monthly WTP for this 
improved water supply from a private connection is NPR 840 (US$11.67) among unconnected 
households, with a 95% confidence interval of NPR 700 to 1010 (US$9.72 to 14.03).  The mean 
monthly WTP for an improved water supply from a shared connection, which includes about 500 
liters of water a day that is risk free and bills that are regular, is NPR 230 (US$3.19).  The 95% 
confidence interval is NPR 30 to 380 (US$0.42 to 5.28).  
 We can also compute the willingness to pay for the subset of households we defined as 
“poor”.  For Group I households (using Option 2), we find that mean monthly WTP of poor 
households is NPR 800 (US$11.11), with a 95% confidence interval of NPR 680 to 910 
(US$9.44 to 12.64).   For Group II, the mean monthly WTP of poor households is NPR 620 
(US$8.61) for a private connection and NPR 240 (US$3.33) for a shared connection.  The 95% 
confidence intervals are reported in Table 13 (note that the WTP for a shared connection is 
actually higher for the poor than for the nonpoor group).  
 
6. What Influences Household Responses? Multivariate Regression Results 
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We conducted multivariate regression analysis of the CV data to further understand 
household preferences for improved water supply services.  Theory and intuition suggest that 
preferences for improved water supply and WTP would differ across population groups with 
different sociodemographic characteristics, existing water situations, and opinions about water 
quality and public policy.  Multivariate regression analyses were used to (1) test joint hypotheses 
based on the statistical significance of coefficients, (2) evaluate preferences for improved water 
supply, and (3) estimate WTP.  Specifically, it allows us to estimate WTP of the poor 
subpopulation by including a measure of poverty as a regressor.  The basic regression equation is 
as follows: 
 
Probability of Choosing Improved Water Source =  
α • Socioeconomic and Demographic Factors +  
β • Water Situation +  
γ • Opinion & Attitudes +  
Error  
 
The choices included private connection, shared connection, or no connection.  Examples of 
socioeconomic and demographic factors include income and age of respondents; examples of 
water situation include number and extent of public or private water sources; and examples of 
opinions/attitudes include environmental priorities and perceptions of NWSC water quality.  
Statistical significance (measured as small p-values) of α, β, and γ allow us to assess the accuracy 
of our CV data.  A larger coefficient typically implies a greater influence on the choice and a 
larger effect on WTP.  That is, households who have higher WTP are more likely to choose a 
private or shared connection and pay the proposed monthly bill.  Consequently, in presenting 
regression results, we discuss positive coefficients as suggesting that households “are more likely 
to connect” and/or “have a higher WTP.” 
In Table 14, we summarize the variables used in the multivariate regression along with 
our hypotheses about the expected relationship between the variables and the connection choice.  
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We chose this mix of variables based on intuition and practicality.  While the primary criterion is 
the potential influence on household preferences, the choice is also conditioned by the availability 
of sufficient observations in our data set for the particular variable. 
 
Influences on Household Choice to Stay Connected to Improved Water Supply Network:   
A Multivariate Probit Model (Group I Households) 
Households with NWSC connections were given the choice between staying connected to 
an improved service or disconnecting from the network.  This information can be recorded as 
dichotomous data (1 = stay connected, and 0 = disconnect) and analyzed using a multivariate 
probit model as in much of the CV literature (Hanemann, 1984; Cameron, 1988; Cameron and 
James, 1987).  Results are presented in Table 15.  We estimated several models using different 
combinations of variables because many of our variables are, at best, approximations of the 
factors that we believe influence household preferences and WTP.  Out of the 1,050 completed 
surveys in this subsample of households, only 3 contained insufficient response data to be 
included in the regression analysis.  Therefore, as noted in Table 15, the analysis is based on 
1,047 observations.  We present two models to highlight multicollinearity problems with the 
regressors.  Unless otherwise suggested, the following discussion corresponds to Model 1 ( 
reported in columns 2 and 3).4
The positive coefficient on the income variable confirms that richer households have a 
higher WTP for an improved private connection.  Income is collinear with several other direct 
and indirect measures of socioeconomic status.  Therefore, it was not surprising that other direct 
                                                 
4 In the tables of model results, the numbers in the column labeled “coefficient” refer to the size of the 
influence of the particular regressor, whereas the numbers in the columns labeled “p-value” refer to the 
statistical significance of that regressor.  In general, a p-value of less than or equal to 0.15 is considered to 
be a statistically significant relationship for cross-sectional data sets of this size. 
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measures such as fuel type, housing time, and monthly expenditure were not statistically 
significant when included in the model along with income.5  
Turning to demographic characteristics, we find that older and male respondents are less 
likely to want to stay connected to the network.  All else equal, we find that more educated 
respondents are more likely to want to stay connected (Model 2).  Renters are less likely to stay 
connected and have a lower WTP in comparison to owners.  This is probably because they have a 
shorter time horizon and are less vested in their current dwelling. 
As expected, households who believed that water contamination is the most important 
environmental problem have a higher WTP for a service that offers to reduce health risks 
associated with contaminated water.  Households who were familiar with the plan to privatize 
NWSC are more likely to want to stay connected and pay higher bills.  We interpret this to mean 
that households like what they have heard about the privatization plan. 
Households who believe that water from their private NWSC water connection is dirty or 
very dirty are less likely to want to stay connected.  On the other hand, households who believe 
that water from their private water connection poses health risks and is unreliable and irregular 
are more likely to want to stay connected and willing to pay more.  This is not a surprising result, 
given that two elements of the improved supply were 24-hour service and water that would be fit 
to drink from the tap. 
Households who are treating their water and who have overhead storage tanks are more 
likely to want to stay connected.  Typically, averting behaviors such as treatment and storage 
provide a signal regarding household valuation of improved services, and the positive association 
is consistent with expectations.  These variables are also correlated with income and with 
                                                 
5  Note that income is not statistically significant in Model 2, which includes education, overhead storage, 
and water treatment as additional regressors, illustrating the multicollinearity problem. 
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perceptions of water quality and therefore negate their statistical power when included in the 
model. 
Finally, the negative coefficient for the proposed monthly bill confirms the downward 
sloping inverse demand curve.  That is, at higher monthly water bills, fewer households want the 
private connection. 
 
Influences on Household Choice to Connect to Improved Water Supply Network:  A Multivariate 
Multinomial Logit Model (Group II Households) 
Households without NWSC connections were given the choice between a private 
connection, a shared connection, or existing sources.  This information can be recorded as 
trichotomous data (2 = private connection, 1 = shared connection, and 0 = use existing sources) 
and analyzed using a multivariate multinomial model (Greene, 1997).  The results are presented 
in Table 16 as two sets of estimates:  the first set relates to household choice of shared 
connection, while the second set relates to household choice of private connection.  These are 
both compared to the choice of continuing with existing sources.  This model is the best among 
several models using different combinations of variables. 
Beginning with the choice of shared connections, we find a negative correlation with 
income.  This might seem like a surprising result if we ignore the fact that households had the 
choice of a private connection and consider just the choice between existing sources and a shared 
connection.  However, it is likely that the private option is influencing this choice because in 
general richer households prefer either to get a private connection or to use their existing 
alternatives.6  Another way of viewing this is that poorer households prefer a shared connection.  
Thus, we find that poor households have a higher WTP for shared connections than the rest of 
this sub-sample. 
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In general, demographic factors do not influence the choice to obtain a shared 
connection.  Similarly, perceptions of water quality/service are statistically insignificant possibly 
because households not connected to the network are not intimately aware of water service 
attributes.  Awareness of the privatization issue appears to increase the likelihood that a 
household will choose a shared connection.  Households who treat their water are more likely to 
choose a shared connection.  Finally, we find that households who use community water 
resources exclusively—such as public tap, public well, neighbors, stone taps, rainwater 
harvesting, and surface water sources—are less likely to choose a shared connection.  This may 
be because these households perceive that the water from stone taps is of very high quality. 
Turning to the model of private connections, we see that income is positively 
correlated with household’s choice of a private connection.  As in the shared choice 
model, the coefficients on household demographics and attributes of water 
quality/services are statistically insignificant, suggesting that these factors do not 
influence the choice of a private connection for households currently without a private 
connection.  Households who believe that water contamination is the most important 
environmental problem are more likely to choose a private connection that offers healthy 
and risk free water. 
Households who engage in substantive averting behaviors—treatment of water and 
storage—are more likely to choose a private connection.  Finally, we find that households who 




                                                                                                                                                 
6If we re-estimate this model with private connection as the comparison group, we find that richer 
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7. Concluding Remarks 
The results of this survey provide the first evidence from South Asia that households’ 
willingness to pay for improved water services are much higher than their current water bills.  
Moreover, our results suggest that households in Kathmandu are positively disposed toward the 
involvement of the private sector in the effort to improve the quality and reliability of piped water 
services.  We find substantive public support among both poor and nonpoor of households for a 
privatization plan that would improve water supply and require all participants to pay regular and 
higher monthly bills.     
Households’ responses to questions about what they would do if the plan were 
implemented, provide a distribution of WTP for the relevant population.  These WTP 
distributions show how many people would connect at different levels of the proposed monthly 
bill and have the expected downward sloping property that is consistent with demand theory.  
Almost 70 percent of the households who are connected to the network are willing to pay a 
monthly bill of NPR 600 (US$8.33) for improved services, which include 500 liters of water a 
day that is risk free and bills that are regular and fair.  Among households who are currently not 
connected to the network, almost 50 percent are willing to pay a monthly bill of NPR 500 
(US$6.94) for similar services.   
Among households connected to the NWSC network, the mean monthly WTP for 500 
liters of improved water supply is NPR 1030 (US$14.31).  For the poor sub-sample within this 
group, the mean monthly WTP is NPR 800 (US$11.11).  Among household unconnected to the 
NWS network, the mean monthly WTP for improved water supply from a private connection is 
NPR 840 (US$11.67).  The mean monthly WTP for improved water supply from a shared 
connection is NPR 230 (US$3.19).  For the poor sub-sample within this group, the mean monthly 
                                                                                                                                                 
households are less likely to choose the shared option.  This finding confirms the statement in the text.   
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WTP is NPR 620 (US$8.61) for a private connection and NPR 240 (US$3.33) for a shared 
connection. 
       Such information may help persuade policymakers of the political and financial 
feasibility of private sector involvement and guide the design of a new tariff structure. 
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Table 1: The Decision Problems Created for the Respondent by the Two CV Questions 
Current Situation  
(Status Quo): 
Choice Set 1 
First CV Question:  
Would you vote to have Choice 
set 1 or  
Choice set 2? 
Second CV Question: Suppose 
you had to choose between the 
options in Choice Set 2  (i.e., the 
majority voted for the plan).  
What would you do? 
Connection to NWSC connection 
with poor service and low water 
bill 
Choice set 1 (status quo): Connect to improved private 
water system 
                    vs.                  vs.                         vs. 
Not connect; rely on public taps, 
private wells, and other sources 
Choice set 2: Connect to 
improved private water system as 
specified price vs. not connect; 
rely on public taps, private wells, 
and other sources 
Rely on public taps, private wells, 
and other sources 
Comment: We know the decision 
the respondent’s household made 
regarding this choice. 
Comment: Respondent tells the 
enumerator which choice set 
he/she prefers by indicating 
whether he/she would vote for 
the plan 
Comment: Respondent tells the 
enumerator whether he/she would 
connect to the improved water 
system if having a connection 
with a low water bill and low 
quality was no longer an option 
 
 
Table 2:  Possible Rankings of Household Water Supply “States of the World” (most preferred to 
less preferred) 
Ranking 1 Ranking 2 Ranking 3 Ranking 4 Ranking 5 Ranking 6 
A. Connected 
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Table 3:  Possible Responses to the Two CV Questions 
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Answer to 1st CV Question: Answer to 2nd CV Question 
(Connect to improved system?): 
YES 
 
Answer to 2nd CV Question 
(Connect to improved system?): 
NO 
Vote for the plan?  YES Pattern 1: YES/YES 
 (Vote for the plan and connect to 
the new system) 
Pattern 2: YES/NO 
 (Vote for the plan, but not connect 
to the new system) 
 
Vote for the plan?  NO Pattern 3: NO/YES 
 (Vote against the plan, but 
connect to the new system) 
Pattern 4: NO/NO 
 (Vote against the plan and not 
connect to the new system) 
 
 
Table 4: Social Profile of Survey Respondents 
 
Number of Respondents Surveyed 1500 
% Male Respondents 63% 
% Male Household Head 86% 
% with Newar Background  61% 
Median Age of Respondents 34 
Average Years of Education 10 
% Read Newspapers with Ease 77% 
% Have More Than 3 Children Who Are Less Then 18 Years Old 57% 
% Have More Than 3 Children Who Are 18 or Older 13% 
Median Monthly Income (NR) 9,000 
Median Monthly Expenditure (NR) 8,000 
% Own the House Respondent’s Family Reside in 88% 
% Live in Single Family – Multiple Story Building  59% 
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 Table 5: Sanitation Facilities Used by Households  
Group I (%) (n=1047) Group II (%) (n=411) 
Sanitation Facilities 
Survey Sample (%) 
(n=1500) Nonpoor Poor Nonpoor Poor 
Water-sealed toilet 92 74 25 42 37 
Pit latrine 1 0 0 0 2 
Public latrine 1 0 0 1 3 
Neighbor’s toilet 2 0 0 2 5 
Bush/No facilities 2 0 0 0 5 
Other 1 0 0 0 3 
 
 
Table 6: Responses of Group I Households to 2 CV Questions vs. Offered Monthly Water Bills   
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questions 



































































Welfare loss 2% 10% 19% 25% 35% 44% 52% 52% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Table 7:  Response Patterns and Number of Respondents in Each Pattern (Connected 
Households) 
Answer to 1st CV Question: Answer to 2nd CV Question 
(Connect to improved system?):  
YES 
 
Answer to 2nd CV Question 
(Connect to improved system?):  
NO 
Vote for the plan? YES Pattern 1:  YES/YES  
Number:  334 
 
Pattern 2:  YES/NO 
Number:  126 
Vote for the plan? NO Pattern 3:  NO/YES 
Number:  47 
Pattern 4:  NO/NO 




Table 8: Welfare Implications of Respondent’s Answers to 2 CV Questions (Connected 
Households) 
 
Response to 2 CV Questions If the Plan Were Implemented, Household Would Experience a … 
Yes/Yes (Pattern 1) Welfare gain 
Yes/No (Pattern 2) Welfare gain (due to value of the option of connecting to the 
improved system in the future) 
No/Yes (Pattern 3) Welfare loss 




Table 9: Summary of Willingness-to-Pay Estimates for All (NPR [US$] per month per 
household) 
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Table 10: Responses of Group II Households to 2 CV Questions vs. Offered Monthly Water Bills  
Respondents in Group who were offered a 






to 2 CV 
questions 
If the plan were 
implemented, 
household would 



























Welfare gain 88% 70% 58% 39% 20% 
 Yes/No 
(Pattern 2) 
No welfare gain, or 
welfare gain (due to 
value of the option of 
connecting to the 
improved system in 
the future) 
0% 1% 0% 1% 5% 
 No/Yes 
(Pattern 3) 
Inconsistent answer 2% 6% 6% 5% 3% 
 No/No 
(Pattern 4) 
No welfare loss; or 
minor welfare loss 
10% 23% 35% 55% 72% 




Table 11:  Response Patterns and Number of Respondents in Each Pattern (Unconnected 
Households) 
Answer to 1st CV Question: Answer to 2nd CV Question 
(Connect to improved 
system?):  YES 
 
Answer to 2nd CV Question 
(Connect to improved 
system?):  NO 
Vote for the plan? YES Pattern 1:  YES/YES  
Number:  151 
 
Pattern 2:  YES/NO 
Number:  18 
Vote for the plan? NO Pattern 3:  NO/YES 
Number:  5 
Pattern 4:  NO/NO 
Number:  207 
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Table 12: Welfare Implications of Respondent’s Answers to 2 CV Questions (Unconnected 
Households) 
Response to 2 CV Questions If the Plan Were Implemented, Household Would 
Experience a … 
Yes/Yes (Pattern 1) Welfare gain 
Yes/No (Pattern 2) No welfare gain, or welfare gain (due to value of 
the option of connecting to the improved system in 
the future) 
No/Yes (Pattern 3) Inconsistent answer 




Table 13:  WTP by household categories (Connected / Unconnected) and (All / Poor) 
 Number of 
Respondents 
Mean WTP 
NPR (US$)  
Per Month 
Lower 95% CI Upper 95% CI 
Connected 











All 383    










Poor 104    
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Table 14:  Independent Variables (Regressors) - Sociodemographic Factors, Existing Water  
Situation, Opinions, and Attitudes 
 
 Mean  







Regression Constant    
Log (monthly income in NPR) 9.12 8.59 + 
Respondent’s age (number of years) 37 37 ? 
Respondent’s gender dummya 
(1= male; 0 = otherwise) 
0.64 0.60 ? 
Respondent’s education (number of years) 9.09 5.90 + 
Renter dummya (1=renter; 0=otherwise) 0.14  – 
Water contamination dummya 
(1=most important environmental problem; 
0=otherwise) 
0.51 0.50 + 
Heard about privatizationa 
(1=heard; 0=otherwise) 
0.40 0.28 + 
Dirty private (NWSC) connection watera 
(1=“dirty” or “very dirty”; 0=otherwise)  
0.76  ? 
Risky private (NWSC) connection watera 
(1=“very risky” or “risky”; 0=otherwise)  
0.81 0.39 + 
Irregular private (NWSC) connection watera 
(1=“irregular” or “unreliable”; 0=otherwise) 
0.61 0.26 + 
Overhead storage dummya 
(1=have overhead storage; 0=otherwise) 
0.64 0.22 + 
Water treatment dummya 
(1=treat water; 0=otherwise) 
0.74 0.38 + 
Only Uses Community Water Sourcesa 
(1=only community sources; 0=otherwise) 
 0.29 – 
aMean estimates of dummy variables should be interpreted as percentage.  For example, the mean of the 
respondent’s gender is 0.64.  This means that 64 percent of the respondents are male. 
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Table 15:  Connected Households—Probit Regression Model Explaining Choice to Connect or 
Reject Improved Private Connection 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable Coefficient p-value>|z| Coefficient p-value>|z| 
Regression Constant 1.093 0.000 0.962 0.002 
Log (monthly income in NPR) 0.052 0.057 0.001 0.982 
Respondent’s age –0.011 0.000 –0.008 0.020 
Respondent’s gender –0.122 0.186 –0.188 0.055 
Respondent’s education   0.034 0.003 
Renter dummy –0.322 0.009 –0.207 0.103 
Water contamination dummy 0.126 0.146 0.142 0.107 
Heard about privatization 0.192 0.033 0.057 0.542 
Dirty private (NWSC) connection water –0.195 0.110 –0.151 0.222 
Risk private (NWSC) connection water 0.368 0.004 0.349 0.007 
Irregular private connection water 0.158 0.074 0.090 0.325 
Overhead storage dummy   0.276 0.008 
Water treatment dummy   0.194 0.093 
Proposed Monthly Bill –0.001 0.000 –0.001 0.000 
No. of Observations  1,047  1,047 
Likelihood Ratio Statistic χ2(10) 227 χ2 (13) 262 
Probability  0.000  0.000 
Pseudo R2  0.165  0.191 
Log likelihood  –573  –556 
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Table 16:  Unconnected (Group II) Households—Multinomial Regression Model Explaining 
Choice to Connect or Reject Improved Private or Shared Connection 
 
 Shared Private 
Variable Coefficient p-value>|z| Coefficient p-value>|z| 
Log (monthly income in NPR) –0.140 0.068 0.437 0.008 
Respondent’s age –0.012 0.311 –0.004 0.715 
Respondent’s education –0.013 0.734 0.034 0.330 
Respondent’s gender dummy –0.334 0.272 –0.058 0.837 
Water Contamination dummy –0.180 0.532 0.759 0.004 
Heard about privatization 0.550 0.134 0.383 0.238 
Risky private (NWSC) connection water –0.309 0.407 0.375 0.239 
Irregular private (NWSC) connection water 0.374 0.354 0.171 0.623 
Overhead storage dummy –0.027 0.951 0.583 0.106 
Water treatment dummy 1.106 0.002 0.697 0.029 
Only uses community sources –0.482 0.140 –0.661 0.026 
Regression Constant 1.004 0.218 –4.845 0.002 
 Choice “neither” is the comparison group 
Likelihood Ratio Statistic R χ2 (22) 99.25 0.000   
Pseudo R2 0.1215    
Log likelihood –358.72    
No. of Observations 383    
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Figure 2.  Inverse Demand Curve for Households without NWSC Connection:  Percent of Home 
Owners Willing to Connect to Private or Shared Connection or Continuing to Use Existing 
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